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Peirce on Musement
The Limits of Purpose and the Importance of Noticing
Elizabeth F. Cooke
AUTHOR'S NOTE
I am grateful to Jerold J. Abrams and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an
earlier draft. Any mistakes that remain are my own.
“A pretty wild play of the imagination is, it cannot
be doubted, an inevitable, and probably even a
useful, prelude to science proper.” 
Peirce, “On Science and Natural Classes” (EP1: 131)
 
1. Introduction
1 From  the  beginning  of  his  writings,  Peirce  establishes  pragmatism  in  opposition  to
Descartes’s  subjectivistic philosophy.  Whereas  Descartes  grounds  his  philosophy  in
infallible  intuition,  Peirce  grounds  thought  in  an  unlimited  community  of  signs  and
fallible inquiry, which aims at truth and knowledge in the final opinion in the long run.
This community of inquiry develops teleologically, in Aristotle’s sense, toward this one
goal of knowledge, and this goal seems to draw all rational inquiry toward completion. If
individuals come together with a commitment to truth and an openness to error, then the
community can and will achieve truth in the long run. Peirce grounds this view in the
assumption that our minds are evolutionarily attuned to nature and this attunement, if
unfettered, draws our guesses toward knowledge of nature. Peirce calls these guesses
“abductions.” Abduction is a distinct form of inference and operates at every level of
experience  from everyday  perception  to  the  most  ingenious  scientific  theory  and  it
generates all new ideas. 
2 But as Douglas Anderson demonstrates in Strands of System: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce,
Peirce holds that abductive inferences, which aim at the final opinion, depend on a more
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subjective, and far less organized, thought process called “musement” (Anderson, 1995:
146-7).  Peirce  develops  this  theory  of  musement  especially  in  his  late  essay,  “The
Neglected  Argument  for  the  Reality  of  God”  (1908,  hereafter  NA),  where  he  defines
musement as “pure play,” and recommends this form of thinking not for the sake of
truth, or problem-solving, or any purpose at all, but merely for recreation. In the NA
Peirce establishes musement as the enjoyable, purposeless, meditative, free, creative, and
contemplative mode of mind. Peirce also recommends practicing musement at a peaceful
time of day, morning or evening, which encourages the mind naturally to generate those
ideas found within its depths, and corresponding to nature, and among these is the idea
of God. 
3 But the theory and practice of musement is by no means limited to Peirce’s philosophical
theology, as Anderson also writes, but lays at the center of his philosophy. In fact, Peirce
emphasizes  the  need  for  free  creative  imaginative  play  in  philosophy  and  science
throughout  his  writings.  For  example,  in  the  epigraph above,  from “On Science  and
Natural Classes,” Peirce writes: “A pretty wild play of the imagination is, it cannot be
doubted, an inevitable, and probably even a useful, prelude to science proper.” Indeed,
while Peirce developed his theory of free play at length only in his very late work, his first
entry into philosophy was this very theory of aesthetic play, which he found in Friedrich
Schiller’s Æsthetical Education of Man (1794) with the concept of “Spieltrieb” (play drive).1 
4 Peirce holds onto this notion of play and develops it in relation to his theory of inquiry,
but  renames  Schiller’s  “Spieltrieb” “musement,”  after  the  Greek  “Muse,”  thereby
capturing pure play’s poetic dimension of inspiration.2 In Greek mythology the Muses are
goddesses who control inspiration, genius,  and creativity in all  the arts and sciences.
Peirce describes the practice of musement in much the same way great poets like Homer,
Virgil, and Dante describe their engagements with the Muse as passive, powerful, and
inspired. But, in some contrast to these poets who claim to hear and record the divine
song of the Muse, Peirce finds musement to be the first stage not just of rare poetry but of
the evolution of many new ideas in science. Musement as the somewhat passive but free
play of mind contains absolutely no purpose, yet undergirds all purposeful advancement
in the community of inquiry, since musement supplies inquiry with its novel insights. So
the pragmatist theory of inquiry, defined primarily by its teleological end, appears to be
grounded in a most unteleological thought process. 
5 The question for this paper is whether we can rationally control musement even though
it has no purpose other than recreation. In the first part of the paper, I argue that in
musement, precisely because she eliminates all purpose from the mind, the muser is able
to notice new signs, anomalies, problems, and questions, which allows her to generate
novel hypotheses by speculating about these newly noticed things. Musement is about
opening oneself up to new problems and anomalies, as well as opening oneself up to new
explanatory hypotheses. 
6 Here three stages of musement, implied in Peirce’s discussion, should be distinguished: 
(1) The pure play of ideas in which the individual is passive to ideas entering her mind,
and  thus  open  to  noticing  new  things,  which  is  akin  to  Peirce’s  phenomenological
category of Firstness, the spontaneity of feeling; 
(2)  noticing strange phenomena, which is akin to Peirce’s category of Secondness,  or
reaction; and
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(3) the creative formation of an hypothesis that explains a strange phenomenon, and
which then can be used in abduction, which is akin to Peirce’s category of generality or
Thirdness. 
7 While many commentators focus on the third stage of musement, I will focus on the first
and second stages. In the second part of the paper, I argue that while we cannot directly
control the reception of new ideas, we can indirectly control the purposeless and free play
of musement insofar as we control when, how, and how deeply we engage in this practice;
and further we consciously choose our ideals prior to musement, which end up bearing
on which novel phenomena we notice in musement. This discussion of the evaluative and
thus  rational  aspect  of  noticing  itself  is  largely  absent  in  the  literature  on Peircean
musement  and  can  help  explain  why  some  people  notice  problems,  wonders,  and
anomalies, while others do not.
 
2. “Evolutionary Love”: Musement’s Role in Peirce’s
Cosmology 
8 The Muses are thought to inspire great poetry, and they come when they will, not when
poets will that they come. Indeed, if the poet seeks to control the Muses, inevitably he
fails. As Peirce writes in “Evolutionary Love” (1893), in the Monist series (1891-1893),
It is as easy by taking thought to add a cubit to one’s stature, as it is to produce an
idea acceptable to any of the Muses by merely straining for it, before it is ready to
come.  We haunt in  vain the sacred well  and throne of  Mnemosyne;  the deeper
workings of the spirit take place in their own slow way, without our connivance.
(EP1:361) 
9 Here again, as in “On Science and Natural Classes,” Peirce develops his Schillerian theory
of play that will become “musement” in the NA. In fact, here in “Evolutionary Love,”
Peirce identifies the same state of free and open and relaxed contemplation as the ground
of new ideas, with the Muses and their mother Mnemosyne Greek goddess of memory.
But here too Peirce writes, as so many others have written of genius and inspiration, like
Homer, Plato, Virgil, Dante, and Popper, that creativity is not within our control. 
10 And yet, in this same discussion in “Evolutionary Love,” Peirce also suggests that the
activity of play might partly fall under our control. While we may not be able to “strive”
for an “idea acceptable to the Muses,” we can initiate play by striving to break up old
habits of thought, in the imagination; and we can alter our surroundings so that the mind
is open to new surprises which brightens ideas (CP6.301/EP1:361). Most of the time, the
mind works almost mechanically, sinking into the condition of a railway junction, but
here in play there appears a “spiritual peninsula, or cul-de-sac” (EP1:361).3 In this way, by
breaking up habits and engaging in play, the mind exercises some preliminary control
over the reception of new ideas. Because this activity is consciously directed, Peirce – in
his  otherwise  Darwinian  theory  of  mind  –  identifies  the  play  of  thought  with  Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck’s teleological theory of evolution in Philosophie Zoologique (1809): “Thus,
the first step in the Lamarckian evolution of mind is putting of sundry thoughts into
situations in which they are free to play” (EP1:361). 
11 It should be noted, however, that one of Peirce’s points in “Evolutionary Love” is that the
individual is not as important as the community in coming up with new ideas. So here
Peirce ultimately argues for what he calls an agapastic view of the evolution of thought,
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which  emphasizes  the  individual,  and  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  evolving
collective thought of society and the age,  generating creative ideas (EP1:369; see also
370-1). While a more social or intersubjective mode of musement also appears to operate
in Peirce’s philosophy, appearing prominently here in “Evolutionary Love,” this mode of
musement must be set aside for purposes of the present discussion. By contrast, a much
more individualistic account of musement appears in the NA, and this account will help
us to address the question of rationally self-controlled play. 
12 Still, individual creativity operates within this evolutionary account of mind, developed
in “Evolutionary Love.” The deeper workings of the spirit operate in the community and
evolve through history in their own slow way.  But these deeper workings ultimately
house themselves in the individual minds who produce all the creative works of the arts
and sciences. Valuably filling in this picture of agapastic creativity, Anderson in Creativity
and the Philosophy of  C. S. Peirce advances what he finds to be Peirce’s implicit  view of
artistic  creativity  and the kind of  rational  self-control  operative  within this  thought
process. According to Anderson, Peirce’s cosmological principle of agape is the principle
of control in God’s ongoing creation of the evolving cosmos, and that it serves as an
analogy for Peirce’s view of human creativity (Anderson, 1987: 109).  Anderson argues
that, for Peirce, an artist controls the creative process by virtue of love for his art which
he allows to grow under his care, like a garden. Anderson (ibid.) quotes Peirce saying,
“The agapastic development of thought is the adoption of certain mental tendencies, not
altogether heedlessly, as in tychasm, not quite blindly by the mere force of logic, as in
anacasm, but by an immediate attraction for the idea itself,  whose nature is  divined
before  the  mind  possesses  it,  by  the  power  of  sympathy,  that  is,  by  virtue  of  the
continuity of mind […]” (CP6.307). Agape allows an attractive idea to evolve and grow on
its own terms (Anderson, 1987: 110). These are the cosmological principles which can
make sense of both God’s and humanity’s creative rational control. As Anderson writes, “
Agape thus  mediates  for  creativity  between purely  tychistic  and anancistic  processes
which Peirce saw as the traditional alternatives. An artist loves his idea and develops it by
letting it suggest its own perfection” (ibid.: 134). 
13 The present view fits within Peirce’s cosmology, as Anderson describes it, but shifts focus
from the cosmology in “Evolutionary Love,” which Anderson ascribes to Peirce’s more
phenomenological account. Peirce sets his phenomenology and categories at the ground
of his philosophy, and these appear in every dimension of his thought, drawing these
categories with one eye on Aristotle and the other on Kant. As Aristotle laid his own ten
categories  of  being  at  the  center of  his  philosophy,  and  Kant  established  his  four
categories of the understanding as shaping all possible experience, Peirce establishes his
own three categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, as operative throughout
the entire universe, which (contra Kant) is knowable in itself. And in contrast to Aristotle
in Physics II.8, and following Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859), Peirce found the mind to
have been shaped by millions of years of evolution, so that Peirce’s (more Aristotelian)
categories of nature reappear within the mind. But once these Aristotelian categories of
nature reappear in new form by evolution within the human mind, they take on a more
Kantian dimension. The spontaneity of nature also reappears within the mind, and this
now Kantian spontaneity of mind shapes perception and experience according to the
categories of the mind, categories which exhaust all possible experience. The spontaneity
(fortuitous  variation)  manifests  itself  most  prominently  within  the  mind as  the  free
creative play of musement. In examining musement, then, we cannot entirely separate
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mind from nature, for the play of musement is an extension of play in nature, in much
the same way Anderson argues human artistic creativity is an extension of spontaneity in
nature.
14 Yet, in musement, these categories may be interpreted in two ways, which stem from the
two main historical and philosophical sources of the categories, namely, Aristotle and
Kant.  If  we take a  more Aristotelian approach to Peirce’s  theory of  musement,  then
musement  appears  to  be  the  cultivation  of  natural  spontaneity  and  teleological
movements,  and  this  more  Aristotelian  approach  appears  in  Anderson’s  more
cosmological discussion of musement. For example, as Anderson writes, the mind tends
its  phenomena  like  a  gardener  tending  a  garden,  where  spontaneity,  variation,
complexity, beauty, and teleology all intertwine, and the function of the gardener, or
inquirer, or muser, appears to be one of an artistically skilled and creative hand who
respects the creativity of nature already operating within her mind, as in nature. Ideas
unfold and bloom by equal parts good cultivation and wise moderation. 
15 On the  more Kantian view,  which I  am advancing,  the gardener  similarly  tends  her
garden  with  many  of  the  same  techniques,  the  same  categories,  the  same
phenomenological  and pragmatist  eyes  as  the Aristotelian gardener.  But  the Kantian
pragmatist gardener freely imposes more of herself into nature, with her own ideals.
What she sees in the garden of her musing mind is partly given by nature, but largely
shaped by the imposition of her own creative mind. Peirce began his philosophical career
as a Kantian transcendental philosopher, but then, partly in response to Darwin, Peirce
moved  to  a  more  Aristotelian  metaphysics  of  potency  and  act,  and  an  evolutionary
objective  idealism.  Still,  these  two major  systems of  philosophy continued to  mix in
complex ways throughout Peirce’s writings, and while some may find him to unfold more
of what is often taken to be a “pragmatist” philosophy, rather than a Kantian philosophy,
Peirce’s theory of musement, advanced in his later years, arises out of his very early
studies in Schiller’s aesthetics of play, in relation to Kant’s theory of the imagination. And
musement still bears the marks of a very Kantian mindset, even while incorporating a
quite Aristotelian view of aesthetic contemplation, as found in the Nicomachean Ethics X.
16 Next we examine Peirce’s account of rational self-control,  and then examine whether
musement may fit this description.
 
3. Self-Control in “What Makes a Reasoning Sound”
17 In  “What  Makes  a  Reasoning  Sound”  (1903)  Peirce  defines  self-control  as  conduct
regulated by one’s ideals. An individual has a certain ideal based on the aesthetic quality
it has for the individual, a consistency with other ideals, and the aesthetic quality of the
consequences she imagines of fully carrying out her ideal (EP2:245-6). Upon reflecting on
his ideal, the inquirer seeks to make his conduct conform to this aesthetic ideal. So, he
formulates rules of conduct, which have an effect upon his disposition so that he modifies
what he is inclined to do (EP2:246-8). He forms resolutions about how he will act under
certain anticipated occasions, and, according to Peirce, “This resolution is of the nature of
a plan,  or,  as one might almost say,  a diagram” (EP2:246).  If  the anticipated occasion
actually  arises,  and  the  individual  acts,  then  afterward,  the  individual  examines
(approvingly  or  disapprovingly)  how  his  actions  compare  with  his  ideal,  and  these
judgments will then affect his future actions (EP2:247-8). A man will review his conduct
and his ideals repeatedly throughout the course of a life (EP2:248).4 It is worth noting
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here that one may very well need creativity in conceiving of an ideal in the first place,
just  as  one  would  most  certainly  need  imagination  in  considering  the  anticipated
occasions one would compare with one’s ideal. This suggests that creativity may be prior
to self-control, and therefore not subject to it. I will have more on this point in the final
section.
 
4. Musement as the Purposeless Free Play of Ideas
18 In the NA Peirce defines musement as follows: 
There is a certain agreeable occupation of mind which, from its having no distinct
name, I infer is not as commonly practiced as it deserves to be; for, indulged in
moderately, – say through some five to six percent of one’s waking time, perhaps
during a stroll, – is refreshing enough more than to repay the expenditure. Because
it  involves  no  purpose  save  that  of  casting  aside  all  serious  purpose,  I  have
sometimes been half-inclined to call it rêverie,  with some qualification; but for a
frame of mind so antipodal to vacancy and dreaminess, such a designation would be
too excruciating a misfit. In fact, it is Pure Play. Now, Play, we all know, is a lively
exercise of one’s powers. Pure Play has no rules, except this very law of liberty. It
bloweth where it listeth. It has no purpose, unless recreation. (EP2:436)
19 “Pure play” is a practice which aims at nothing outside itself and is done for its own
enjoyment, for recreation alone. And it is not practiced frequently enough. Unlike the
play of a game, there are no purposes or rules in pure play, or musement, except the one
law of liberty. Peirce confesses to a temptation to call play “rêverie,” but retracts that
name  because  it  suggests  vacancy.  Like  Schiller’s  Spieltrieb,  Peirce’s  musement  is
intellectual free play without form or hindrance,  performed for the sake of pleasure.
After defining musement as free play, Peirce then quotes John 3:8 in the Bible: “It bloweth
where it  listeth.”5 This  quotation,  in Peirce at  least,  suggests  a  passive dimension to
musement as well as a religious dimension, consistent with the purpose of the essay, “A
Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” in which Peirce argues that musement “will
in time flower into the N.A.” (EP2:436). The more passive, though not vacant, perspective
of  musement would seem more consistent  with Anderson’s,  what  I  am calling,  more
Aristotelian view, where musement does what it  does,  and the gardener functions to
allow musement as a fertile intellectual garden to “flower into the N.A.” 
20 Because musement must be free, there is,  for Peirce, no single way to engage in this
practice.  Musement  “may take either  the  form of  esthetic  contemplation,  or  that  of
distant  castle-building  (whether  in  Spain  or  within one’s  moral  training),  or  that  of
considering some wonder in one of the Universes [of signs] or some connection between
two of the three, with speculation concerning its cause” (EP2:436). It is this last kind of
play  which  Peirce  calls  specifically  the  “play  of  musement,”  in  which  the  mind  is
naturally  led  to  the  hypothesis  of  God  for  its  natural  aesthetic  attractiveness.  In
musement one follows questions and ideas wherever they may lead, suggesting a thought
process cultivated with an openness to wonder and anomalies. Yet Peirce thinks most
people  tend  to  begin  musement  with  psychological  questions,  which  often  lead  to
musings on variety among the universes, and then continuity among them, finding in
these universes of signs the phenomenon of evolution or growth, the growth of signs
themselves. And then, reflecting on growth of signs in the three universes, whether or
not the muser be consciously contemplating the concepts Peirce articulates, Peirce claims
that anyone may arrive at the hypothesis of the reality of God, and will be stirred to the
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depths of her nature by the beauty of that idea, and by its practicality, to shape one’s
conduct into conformity with it, i.e. to believe it (EP2:440). Peirce’s third-person account
of musement in the NA can still appear deterministic, since Peirce describes musement as
almost destined to end in a hypothesis about God. But Peirce also insists that musement is
a practice in which one can decide to engage, suggesting that it is within our control
(EP2:436).
21 While it is important to articulate the context of the NA in which the theory of musement
appears, it is no less important to bear in mind the centrality of that theory to the whole
of Peirce’s philosophy. In fact, even in the religious context of the discussion in the NA,
Peirce  claims  that  play  may  function  as  part  of  the  first  stage  of  inquiry  of  which
abduction is an essential part (EP2:440-1). And again, as Peirce writes in “On Science and
Natural Classes,” science depends on “a pretty wild play of the imagination.” In fact, even
in  “The  Fixation  of  Belief”  (1877)  musement  operates  as  a  condition  of  inquiry.  As
Anderson writes in Strands of System, while Peirce often uses Romantic and poetic imagery
to describe it, ultimately musement plays a fundamental role in the basic structure of
inquiry.
In less romantic terms, this underdetermination in musement can also be seen as a
condition of the scientific method of ‘The Fixation of Belief’; it is the only method
that  does  not  begin inquiry  with its  goal  already presupposed.  Musement  is  an
activity  in  which we may choose,  in  a  self-controlled  fashion,  to  engage,  but  it
leaves room for tychistic development, for ideas ‘to grow up spontaneously out of
Pure Play without any breach of continuity.’ (Anderson, 1995: 146)6
22 Science and its various stages of inquiry all have their goal presupposed, but all rest on
musement,  which  does  not  have  its  goal  presupposed.  We  can  control  musement,
according to Anderson,  at  the beginning with the choice to enter the state,  but  this
control is not very great, for in musement ideas must be free to rise up in the mind
spontaneously (tychistically).7 Anderson takes up the question of control in musement
again in relation to abduction, and again describes the activity of musement as play that
begins with control but does not proceed with control. As Anderson (1995: 157) writes,
[…] while retroduction is self-controlled, this first moment of critical reasoning is
not fully controlled. There is a spontaneous dimension; the reasoner controls to the
point  of  permitting  the  play  of  ideas  but  then  must  respond  to  retroductive
suggestions as they present themselves.
23 Here Anderson establishes the precise interval of control in Peirce’s theory of inquiry
between musement and abduction. The inquirer, by an act of conscious self-control leaves
controlled inquiry and enters the open and playful state of musement, and then emerges
from the free play of ideas with an insight utilized in controlled inquiry.
24 Of course, Peirce holds that scientific inquiry is a rational, self-controlled, and purposeful
activity, which aims at truth in the long run. So, it appears that the purposeful activity of
inquiry  ultimately  arises  from  the  purposeless  but  creative  activity  of  play.  That
relationship and apparent tension raises the question whether play can be controlled at
all, beyond “permitting the play of ideas,” especially if it has no purpose. 
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5. Thinking without Purpose Enables One to Notice
Novelty
25 But while this lack of purpose gives musement its freedom, it is not clear how we are to
make sense of a thought process which has no purpose, especially considering that, for
Peirce, all thought is in signs, and all signs are end-directed. As T. L. Short argues that
semiosis is always teleological, for Peirce (Short, 2004: 230). In conscious thought, a sign
prompts a trajectory of thought insofar as a sign represents an object (in a certain respect
and for a certain purpose) to an interpretant, so all thought is purposeful insofar as it is
interpretive.8 Of course, musement is thought in signs, and signs are teleological, and this
teleology  appears  in  the  phenomena  of  growth  in  musement,  and  yet  musement  is
purposeless. But musement must have at least some purpose in order to be meaningful at
all, in order to be semiotic at all, and to bear the fruit that it does. Peirce must mean that
musement does not have a set-out agenda or plan, as we might have when we set out to
plan a vacation, prove a theory, grow flowers, or paint a painting.
26 Perhaps we can understand the purposelessness of musement in this way. In discussing
associations  of  the  mind,  Peirce  explains  that  when we  say  that  some  thought  has
occurred to us, that thought does not actually enter consciousness. Rather, for Peirce, the
thought is already there in consciousness and only seems to enter into consciousness
when the thought becomes semiotically connected with another idea in a voluntary act of
reasoning, and so becomes subjectively vivid enough to “find a place in our narrative”
(CP7.435). Now if a voluntary act of thought (i.e., a purposeful one) makes some ideas,
which are already there in consciousness, more vivid, then trying to get rid of purpose, as
we do in musement, might make many more of our ideas vivid at once, or make some
ideas less vivid, thereby allowing other ideas to become more vivid. Whether novelty
comes from new experience or from exploring what is already there in one’s mind, but
which has not yet found “a place in our narrative,” musement’s purposelessness seems to
offer the benefit of allowing potential ideas to become actual when they otherwise would
not have, due to our previous purposes holding the reins. 
27 Also central  to  understanding musement  as  purposeless  is  the question whether  the
wonder,  which becomes the focus  of  musement,  initiates  musement,  or  results  from
musement. Admittedly Peirce in the NA says musement begins with “considering some
wonder in one of  the Universes or  some connection between two of  the three,  with
speculation concerning its cause” (EP2:436). But it is not clear whether Peirce means that
one sets out to muse about a wonder (and its cause), or whether one considers a wonder,
and then in the process of musement, begins to speculate about its cause, or, as a third
possibility,  whether one sets out to muse and then, through this process,  notices the
wonder and begins to speculate about its cause. There are significant differences here.
For example, if one sets out to muse about a cause of a wonder, then musement already
has the purpose of  finding a  cause.  And even if  one simply begins  to muse about  a
wonder,  musement  would  already  have  a  focus,  something  already  deemed  to  be  a
wonder  or  a  curiosity  worthy  of  speculation,  and  this  too  would  give  musement  a
purpose. But if one sets out to think for no particular purpose, and, in doing so, certain
wonders,  surprises,  and  anomalies  naturally  come  up,  then  this  activity  better  fits
Peirce’s description of musement as performed for the sake of recreation, and without a
particular purpose, but which may gain a purpose through this open thought process.
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Within this purposeless activity, the muser lays open her mind to noticing and identifying
a wonder or a surprise worthy of subsequent speculation as to its cause and nature. This
view makes the most sense of Peirce’s comments on musement.
28 Peirce claims that inquiry begins with surprises which we seek to explain and understand
(EP2:440-1).  Peirce also includes the noticing of a wondrous phenomenon in this first
general stage of inquiry, which means that noticing strange phenomena is part of the
creative hypothesis-generating part of science (EP2:441). In this way, musement as an
openness to surprise and to noticing wonders can be seen to function as a condition for
inquiry. And Peirce’s discussions on musement suggest that creativity is not only about
problem solving whereby the creative work is done within the narrow parameters of the
problem at hand, but that creativity is often about noticing, which allows one to find a
good (important or interesting) problem upon which to speculate in the first place. This is
an important dimension that is overlooked in many accounts of creativity.9 
 
6. Entering Musement
29 In his early anti-Cartesian papers Peirce rejected the subjectivist and detached view of
mind, which John Dewey in The Quest for Certainty (1929) would later call the “spectator
theory of knowledge” (Dewey, 2008: 19). Perhaps nothing could be more antithetical to
pragmatism than this view of the mind as a disengaged spectator, and yet something like
this view appears to be what Peirce sets at the center of his philosophy with musement.
In one of the most poetic passages of the NA, Peirce describes musement as deeply passive
and spectatorial, and yet also dialogical.
‘Enter your skiff  of  Musement,  push off  into the lake of  thought,  and leave the
breath of heaven to swell your sail. With your eyes open, awake to what is about or
within you, and open conversation with yourself; for such is all meditation.’ It is,
however, not a conversation in words alone, but is illustrated, like a lecture, with
diagrams and with experiments. (EP2:437) 
30 A skiff is a light and small boat, typically with a flat bottom. A skiff has no rudder and no
motor, but can have a sail to be blown by the wind. We enter our skiff,  according to
Peirce, we take in our oars, and push off into the lake of thought. We give up control and
allow musement  (like  the  wind)  to  take  us  where  it  will.  Peirce  calls  this  activity  a
meditation and conversation with oneself,  which suggests a rational thought process,
with  some  level  of  control  over  the  activity.  Peirce  also  describes  the  muser’s
conversation not only in words but illustrated with diagrams and experiments “like a
lecture.” But it is not clear whether she is giving or receiving a lecture, and it is not clear
whether she is constructing and interacting with her own diagram or receiving it. 
31 In support of musement as dialogical, but somewhat passive, Michael Raposa in Peirce’s
Philosophy of Religion argues it is also a kind of listening.10 Raposa claims that in musement
the individual should be attentive and fully awake, listening with lively attention, to the
back-and-forth  of  passive  and  active  thinking,  like  the  give-and-take  of  actual
conversation (Raposa, 1989: 210). But in entering this thought process, one treats one’s
previous beliefs and concepts in a detached way, “as though one did not have them,”
which thereby allows one to treat the contents of the mind playfully (ibid.: 215). Kathleen
Hull in “Why Hanker After Logic? Mathematical Imagination, Creativity and Perception in
Peirce’s  Systematic  Philosophy,” emphasizes  the  visual  over the  verbal  nature  of
musement, but similarly argues that in musement we must inhibit the self in order to
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perceive “the spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason,” and then observe nature, or
our diagrams, in a more self-controlled way, where we will see correctly and arrive at
necessary perceptions (Hull, 1994: 289-90). 
32 Raposa’s listening interpretation, and Hull’s visual interpretation, both appear in Peirce’s
NA, and I follow both interpretations, as well as Anderson, in portraying musement as
partly passive. But, as these commentators view musement as a process of generating,
contemplating,  and  selecting  hypotheses,  we  also  extend  this  passive  listening  and
attentiveness  of  musement  to  include  the  noticing  of  phenomena  as  strange  and
anomalous  from the start.  The process  of  musement  includes  a  kind of  openness  to
puzzles,  surprises,  and  anomalies  that  are  in  need  of  explanation,  in  addition  to
generating and selecting hypotheses. On my view, musement not only opens us up to
discovering solutions to problems (because it opens our minds to possibilities beyond our
current beliefs),  but also opens our minds to problems and constraints that were not
previously noticed or appreciated, and thereby gives us new wonders about which to
hypothesize. 
33 In “On the Algebra of Logic” (1885) Peirce writes that thinking is prompted by irritation
and  stimulation  (CP3.155),  but  surprise  need  not  arise  externally  –  one  can  also
experience surprise internally from a fancy, from our own imagination, which can begin a
train of thought (CP3.159).11 In musement one opens oneself up to experiencing, either
from fancy or the world, new surprises that might otherwise go unnoticed and unfelt. So
musement includes the initial process of opening oneself up to being surprised and to
noticing  strange,  surprising,  wonderful  phenomena,  and  the  speculation  about
explanations, and the generation of hypotheses.
 
7. The Importance of Noticing
34 The first moment of abduction is the appearance of a surprising or strange phenomenon.
And we do not need to muse in order to notice a strange phenomenon and then creatively
form an abduction. In fact, we creatively form abductions all day long. But we miss things
and fail to make abductions all day long as well. Musement is ideal for noticing strange
and surprising phenomena that might otherwise go unnoticed. It is important that we
open ourselves up not only to strange things, but also to wondrous things, and wondrous
things that are familiar but under-appreciated or previously unnoticed. In “The Universal
Categories” (1903) Peirce implies a need for the kind of openness to new wonders we find
here in musement when he argues that sometimes the truly wondrous things are the
familiar things that typically go unnoticed in favor of the more obviously strange or
different. 
[…] [T]he Faradays and Newtons seem to themselves like children who have picked
up a  few pretty pebbles  upon the  ocean beach.  But  most  of  us  seem to  find it
difficult  to  recognize the greatness  and wonder of  things familiar  to us.  As the
prophet  is  not  without  honor  save  [in  his  own  country]  so  it  is  also  with
phenomena. Point out to the ordinary man evidence, however conclusive, of other
influence than physical action in things he sees every day, and he will say: ‘Well, I
don’t see as that frog has got any points about him that’s any different from any
other frog.’ For that reason we welcome instances perhaps of less real cogency but
which have the merit of being rare and strange. (CP5.65)
35 Most of us walk upon the beach and think nothing of a pebble or a frog. But the great
scientists like Faraday and Newton look at common and everyday things and see them as
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strange and marvelous. Their minds seem to live in a more childlike and playful state.
Peirce thinks of musement as precisely this frame of mind for noticing the miraculous in
the common. Noticing great and wonderful things can be difficult because often they are
so familiar and because the mind becomes habituated to seeing them all the time. But in
musement the mind is  open to considering the most common and everyday features
anew. And sometimes when we do this, even familiar things can all of a sudden be noticed
anew and felt even as surprising and wondrous. 
36 Now abduction depends not just on having the initial surprise but also on feeling its need
for an explanation.  As Peirce writes in “On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient
Documents, Especially from Testimonies” (1901),
Abduction  makes  its  start  from  the  facts,  without,  at  the  outset,  having  any
particular theory in view, though it is motived by the feeling that a theory is needed
to explain the surprising facts. (EP2:106) 
37 Abduction begins with a strange or surprising phenomenon. And musement is the process
of opening oneself to such surprises and anomalies and to the feeling that a theory is
needed to explain the surprising fact. (And, again, the mind in musement doesn’t just
begin  with  an  openness  to  questions,  but  is  open  throughout,  following  the  ideas,
anomalies,  surprises  and  questions  wherever  they  lead.)  So  creative  thinking  in
musement is not just a kind of dialectic which answers questions, but one that finds and
raises questions.  And it  seems we are  aesthetically  motivated in  musement  since  we
engage for the sake of recreation alone, for pleasure. So, if we are interested in fostering
this kind of creativity that yields novel problems and questions, then it seems we have to
foster a kind of enjoyment of open-ended and purposeless thinking. 
38 Again, we cannot control receiving novel ideas by simply striving for them, as Peirce
writes in “Evolutionary Love.” And the surprise which prompts inquiry itself cannot be
controlled, since it does not make sense to say that one can set out to be surprised. But we
can try to leave ourselves open to new and interesting surprises. And if we do this while
attempting to neutralize our current beliefs and traditions, as Raposa (2012b: 52-3) writes,
then we may come upon surprises which prompt new lines of inquiry and hence new
ideas.  Of  course,  we can have no guarantees that  we will  see strange and surprising
phenomena, and yet, as Peirce writes of abduction, the mind is adapted to see and know
the world. Only, the mind must detach itself from its everyday habits of looking at the
world in order to see it better. 
 
8. Is Musement Self-Controlled?
39 Now we must consider whether musement is more in line with rational self-control or
whether it lies beyond our control, like perceptual judgments. For Peirce, in “What Makes
Reasoning Sound,” reasoning “is essentially thought that is under self-control,  just as
moral conduct is conduct under self-control” (EP2:249; see also EP2:188 and 337). And this
is why Peirce regards reason as a part of ethics. In the same way that we evaluate actions
according to ideals, we also evaluate reasoning according to ideals, continually checking,
evaluating, and approving our thoughts (like our actions) as rational (EP2:249-50). But
thought must be checked and deliberately approved to be called rational (EP2:250). An
operation of the mind is considered reasonable, if there is an ideal to which a person
compares his thinking when it is done. If an activity of the mind is rational and self-
controlled,  then this  means that  it  is  also a  conscious operation,  as  Peirce writes  in
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“Issues  of  Pragmaticism”  (1905,  EP2:348)  and  “The  Basis of  Pragmaticism  in  the
Normative Sciences” (1906, EP2:387). But there are limits to self-control in thought and in
inquiry,  as  we  do  not  exercise  control  over  perceptual  judgments  or  our  already
established beliefs (EP2:387; see also 169, 240-1, 337). 
40 Raposa,  Hull,  and  Roberta  Kevelson  in  Peirce  and  the  Mark  of  the  Gryphon,  all  claim
musement is a kind of reasoning, which would mean that it is self-controlled.12 Yet, this
implication does not seem to be central to Peirce’s own discussion of musement. And
further, there are at least two reasons why musement would appear not to be rationally
self-controlled. First, as we have already discussed, musement does not have a purpose
initially, except for the purpose of musing itself. It proceeds throughout in a very open-
ended way, taking up problems and leaving them for new ones, following ideas wherever
they lead. The second reason follows from the first, namely, that there is no possibility for
error in musement, in contrast to inquiry, in general.13 In musement the free-playing
mind cannot go wrong because it does not aim at anything in particular. 
41 For these reasons, on our view, musement does not fit neatly into this model of rational
self-control. But as we shall argue in the next section it does fit there loosely because,
within musement, even while it is passive, we still evaluate and make judgments for good
reasons. 
 
9. Musement as Internally Rational Yet Without
Purpose
42 While our focus has been on musement as an initial stage of creativity in science, art, and
even  everyday  thinking,  Anderson’s  discussion  on  the  rational  control  of  artistic
creativity remains a helpful guide. In Creativity Anderson claims that, for Peirce, “as an
artist creates, his telos gets refined. It grows and becomes more and more distinct. Thus,
in the same way that for Peirce the universe itself moves from the vague to the definite,
an  artist’s  telos  crystallizes  in  its  unique  particularity”  (Anderson,  1987:  5-6).  For
Anderson, the artist does not have full rational control of his activity and the activity may
not even be his, but the control the artist has is in developing a telos and letting it grow
under his care (ibid.: 6).14 But artistic creativity can be seen as rational, despite the artist
not knowing where he is going initially, because he tends to his work, engages it, and has
agapastic concern for it. 
43 Following Anderson, I also argue that, even in the initial stages of creative musement, the
play of  ideas which enables us to notice new things can also be seen to be rational,
although it  begins without  purpose,  but  for  the following distinct  reason:  musement
seems to be evaluative through and through. And if it is evaluative, then musement must
appeal to an ideal. And if it consciously appeals to an ideal, then musement can be said to
fit loosely into Peirce’s model for rational self-control. 
44 Creativity  often includes  noticing interesting  and important  phenomena to  consider,
which requires evaluation and appealing to ideals. But not only is there evaluation in
selecting which feature of reality on which to focus one’s speculation, for even the very
having  of  surprising  experience  or  the  very  noticing  of  wondrous  or  anomalous
phenomena  can  be  thought  of  as  evaluative  insofar  as  a  surprising  experience  is
influenced by  what  we  know and what  we  value.  Some things  strike  one  person as
surprising, while another person who experiences the same thing is not struck by the
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experience (and therefore really has a different kind of experience), and does not judge it
to be anomalous because she differs in her knowledge or values. We typically cannot help
but form expectations, some of which will be disappointed, and thus cannot help but be
surprised. But which experiences are surprising will differ for different people. If,  for
example,  a  person does  not  know that  camels  are  mostly  a  desert  animal,  then she
probably would not feel surprised to learn that camels can swim.15 But it is also the case
that if a person knows, but does not care, about desert animals, or does not care about
what animals can or cannot do, then she may not experience surprise upon seeing camels
swim. While we all experience surprise pervasively throughout our everyday experience,
for Peirce, we are surprised about different things (CP1.332). Our beliefs and our cares
partly constitute our expectations about the way the world is. These beliefs, cares, and
values  are  normative  and  descriptive,  and  they  function  to  prime  the  pumps  of
perception for  experiencing different  kinds  of  surprises  throughout  one’s  day-to-day
experience.  When one lacks  care or  belief,  some potentially  surprising signs  are not
recognized or felt as surprising, and thus cannot initiate further thought. 
45 But do cares and values function like ideals in Peirce’s account of self-control? Ideals, for
Peirce, are chosen, and have a regulative effect on the individual, whereas one may care
or value something without having chosen these as her ideals. Nonetheless, often cares
and values do indicate a chosen ideal. For example, because a mother cares, she might
notice (and be surprised by the fact) that her daughter is missing her lunchbox on her
way  to  school.  The  mother’s  noticing  indicates  her  cares  and  values, but  this  also
indicates an ideal she holds, namely, that her daughter eats all her meals. The surprise
reveals to her not just her previous beliefs, which are sometimes held unconsciously, but
also her ideals and values, which are not unconscious, but which might not have been
initially  at  the  forefront of  her  consciousness  at  the  moment  when she  notices  the
missing  lunchbox.  Still  her  ideals  and  values  are  there.  Similarly,  throughout  the
different stages of musement, we engage our previous beliefs, values, and ideals as we
face new ideas and experiences, even though we did not set out to fulfill our ideals when
we set out to muse. 
46 But is this still reason if we did not set out to fulfill a goal? While musement may not
begin with a plan or purpose, nonetheless reasons are internal to the thought process.
Even at the initial stage, the muser has reasons for noticing something as anomalous and
experiencing it as surprising insofar as she can rationally explain why she felt or took
something to be surprising in relation to her previous expectations – even if she did not
know what her previous expectations were. Experience in general is more passive than
rational thought, but because surprise is based on our previous expectations and values,
it may mean that sometimes we take some things (and not others) as surprising for good
reason, although we did not muse with a plan to notice or be surprised in the way that we
were.  Of  course,  there is  a  difference between giving a rational  explanation for why
something was experienced as surprising (e.g. I noticed a sugar maple tree in the park,
because I was thinking of planting one in my own yard), and giving a causal explanation
for why something was surprising (e.g., I noticed that billboard because it was red and
bright: it caught my eye). Here we mean a rational rather than a causal account for not
just selecting some surprise as worth pursuing, but a rational account for even having the
surprising experience itself. Reason is at work at all stages of musement, including in the
very experiencing of surprising anomalies.16 And since Peirce’s muser acts for reasons,
some ideals must be at work. And since Peirce’s muser does not set out to fulfill these
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ideals before musing, she must do so within this thought process in order to make these
judgments. In musement one is open to these challenges and surprises without knowing
exactly where the thought process will take her. When she sets out to muse, she sets out
to reason in a way she did not  plan.  In addition to noticing,  of  course,  there is  the
attraction to an idea that occurs in musement, as Anderson discusses, in the play of ideas
in both art and science and, of course, in musement in the NA (Anderson, 1987: 110, 131).
We allow ourselves to be attracted to an idea and this attraction to an idea is also a
reflection of one’s previously chosen ideals and values in addition to agape.  So one’s
ideals influence the entire process of musement, even the initial stage of noticing.
 
10. No Error in Musement 
47 We can understand musement as a creative thought process which does not proceed
according to a pre-planned goal, and also understand musement as rational insofar as
musement employs ideals and reasons internal to the activity of thinking itself. Yet there
is another important sense in which musement does not fit the model of rational self-
control precisely, namely, musement does not err. There is no sense in which one can go
wrong in musement qua musement precisely because musement doesn’t have a goal –
neither an explicit goal in the mind of the muser, nor a goal hidden to the muser. One can
muse and come up with incorrect  hypotheses,  of  course,  but  this  is  not  an error  of
musement in its primary mode of free play and noticing.17 At least at the noticing stage of
musement, when one notices something strange, we cannot say that it is wrong to notice
it  or to find it  surprising.18 Of  course,  it  may seem strange to say that  musement is
evaluative, and yet cannot error. But the kind of evaluative claims that the individual
makes in musement, especially at this noticing stage, are not truth claims, but claims
regarding what is interesting, puzzling, and worth thinking about some more. 
48 Yet,  while  we  cannot  muse  according  to  a  purpose  and  we  cannot  make  errors  in
musement, we nonetheless can and do evaluate our musings retrospectively. And, in this
sense, musement fits at least part of the model of self-control whereby we compare our
past actions with our ideals and standards. So, while there may not be a way to have
erroneous thoughts in musement, there is, nonetheless, a sense in which one might muse
well or muse poorly. Both the noticing of anomalies and the hypothesis formation in
musement can be more or less valuable, more or less novel, more or less relevant, more
or  less  interesting,  or  even healthy.  One may also  have better  or  worse  reasons  for
noticing what one does and selecting what one selects to ponder, and we may only be able
to judge these reasons as more or less helpful, after musement is done. These judgments
are made in light of ideals not necessarily at the forefront of our consciousness during
musement. But although we may make judgments about the goodness or fruitfulness of
musement  only  after  musement  has  concluded,  and  although  it  is  not  the  job  of
musement to be helpful, relevant, interesting, or true, this does not mean that the ideals
we use to make those judgments were not at work during musement. While there may not
be a  purpose in musement,  there are always ideals  at  work influencing the process,
allowing the person to make the judgments she makes in her musement. And perhaps
sometimes the reason why someone has more helpful,  interesting, and relevant ideas
when she muses is due to her ideals. One cannot muse without beliefs, values, and ideals
already in place, even if she can suspend her immediate purpose. And again, one’s values
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and beliefs influence what one notices, even if one attempts to neutralize one’s beliefs, in
Raposa’s sense, so that she can muse relatively freely. 
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NOTES
1. Schiller (1884: 120). 
2. See Jeffrey Barnouw 1988. Barnouw argues the early influence of Schiller on Peirce extends
throughout Peirce’s writings. In particular, Barnouw argues that the root of Peirce’s reasoning as
self-control is a habit of feeling, which has been subjected to self-criticism, and this Peirce gets
from Schiller. As Barnouw writes (ibid.: 609), “Aesthetics so conceived is a discipline governing
the deliberate formation of habits of feeling which should inform our responses, our readiness to
act in particular ways given particular circumstances. This is the main respect in which Friedrich
Schiller’s conception of aesthetic education as cultivation of the capacity of feeling (Ausbildung
des Empfindungsvermögens) should be seen as an influential model for Peirce.”
3. See also Roberta Kevelson (1999: 220). She discusses Peirce’s view on how we might indirectly
control creativity and induce novelty (ms. 1105) “by deliberately distorting the means by which
we habitually, consciously transform sensibility into thought” (Kevelson, 1999: 220).
4. See Helmut Pape (2012: 159). Here Pape argues that self-control, for Peirce, does not entail
controlling  oneself  at  a  particular  moment,  but  is  an  ongoing  process,  which  entails  both
Peirce on Musement
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-2 | 2018
16
prospective  anticipation  and  retrospective  reflections  in  comparing  one’s  actions  with  one’s
ideals (CP8.320).
5. This same passage appears in George Santayana’s Realms of Being (2009: 152): “Spirit bloweth
where it listeth, and continually undoes its own work.”
6. See also Anderson (1987: 42). 
7. See also Royce Jones (1976: 357); and Sara Barrena (2013: 12).
8. According to Gabriele Gava in Peirce’s Account of Purposefulness: A Kantian Interpretation (2014),
purposefulness  is  a  necessary  condition  for  semiosis.  Gava  argues  that  the  metaphysics  of
cosmology and growth depend upon Peirce’s account of the necessity of purpose in thinking and
sign processes (and not the other way around, like other scholars argue) (ibid.: 2).
9. For example, Margaret Boden in “Artificial Intelligence: A Contradiction in Terms?” discusses
several kinds of creativity, one of which she calls transformational creativity because the novel
structure does  not  fit  into previously  known styles.  In  these cases  “the originator  alters  (or
drops) some previously recognized constraint or adds one or more new ones.” But Boden does
not discuss the thought process whereby someone notices there was a constraint there to begin
with (2014: 228-9).
10. Michael  Raposa  in  “Musement  as  Listening:  Daoist  Perspectives  on  Peirce,”  emphasizes
listening over looking since it is more passive (2012a: 214). See also Anderson (1995: 148) who
also discusses the phenomenological and perceptive part of musement as well as the internal
dialogue and diagrammatic part of musement.
11. See Kevelson’s discussion of this passage in her discussion on musement and creativity (1999:
221).
12. See Raposa (1989: 125). See also Hull (2005: 493), and Kevelson (1999: 219).
13. Short in Peirce’s Theory of Signs (2007: 154) argues that wherever there is purpose, there can be
success or failure, better or worse, and thus, self-correction, but without purpose, there can be
no mistakes. Similarly, James Liszka in “Charles Peirce on Ethics,” (2012: 56) also argues that
purposive action and rational self-control go together, and that without the possibility of error
and self-correction, it is difficult to see how there can be self-control.
14. Anderson  sees  his  interpretation  as  evidence  that  Peirce  held  the  claim  we  find  in
contemporary aesthetics that an artist does not know fully what he is going to create until he
creates it (ibid.:  5-6). See also Collingwood who argues in The Principles of Art (1958) that true
creative art (as opposed to craft) cannot have a preplanned goal in mind beforehand – otherwise
it is not true creativity (ibid.:  129). See also Maitland (1976: 397); Kieran (2014: 127, 129); and
Harrison (1971: 111-2, 115, 118). 
15. I am grateful to R. Abrams for this example. 
16. Hull  argues  that  in  one sense  both musement  and mathematical  reasoning are  not  self-
controlled  logics  because  they  are  semiotic  or  interpretive  activities,  not  rule-following
activities.  But  Musement,  like  mathematics,  is  an observational  activity.  But  Hull  (1994:  286)
thinks  it  is  still  rationally  self-controlled,  because  she  reads  Peircean  self-control  as  being
inhibitory in the sense of controlling the self so that we may perceive genuine Thirdness (in the
mathematical diagram). 
17. It  may  be  argued  that,  at  later  stages  of  musement,  which might  take  on  a  purpose  of
explaining some anomaly, musement can be said to go wrong, because it can go right, as Peirce
claims musement can provide the “smoothly fitting keys” to problem (EP2:437).
18. Of course, surprise itself is the discovery of an error in a previous belief or expectation. But
the discovery of an error is not itself an error but rather an achievement. See Cooke 2011. 
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ABSTRACTS
An  apparent  tension  persists  in  Peirce’s  philosophy  between  the  purpose-driven  nature  of
inquiry, destined to achieve truth in the long run, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the
fact that inquiry depends upon musement (or the free play of ideas), which is purposeless. If
there  is  no  purpose  in  musement  then  it  would  appear  there  is  no  rational  self-control  in
musement, and thus, irrationality lies at the center of Peirce’s theory of inquiry. I argue that in
musement the individual sets off without a purpose, thereby opening herself to noticing novelty,
and that noticing is itself a form of creative thought insofar as it allows the individual to discover
new wonders and anomalies. Not all creativity in inquiry aims at solving problems or formulating
new hypotheses. Some creative thinking is about noticing what is already there or possibly there.
Such noticing in musement is  purposeless,  and yet  the individual  retains some rational  self-
control  within  this  thought  process.  She  controls  the  entry  into  the  activity,  and,  prior  to
musing, she controls the adoption of the ideals which are inevitably employed in musement. This
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